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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to consider whether recent
deregulations in Sweden will be significant in establishing
institutional investors from that country as new sources of
capital for U.S. real estate markets during the next five
years. To help contemplate the likelihood of this occurring,
this thesis examines various factors which are likely to
influence the direction of Swedish institutional investments
in the future, including the existing structure of the State
pension system, the potential effects of an aging population,
and the consequences of a unified European market. To
provide clues to future investment behavior, the historical
investment strategies of two Swedish insurance companies are
compared with those of the State pension system. For further
perspective, aspects of the investment patterns of British,
Dutch, and U.S. institutional investors are discussed, as
well.
The findings of a survey of Swedish institutional investors
are contrasted with those of a similar study conducted in the
United States to identify fundamental similarities and
differences in approach to property investment. Finally,
this thesis examines some of the reasons foreign investors
have historically been attracted to U.S. real estate and
considers their potential importance in the decision-making
process of Swedish institutional investors today.
Thesis supervisor: Marc A. Louargand
Title: Lecturer, Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
In the last year, investors in U.S. real estate have
witnessed the impact of changing capital markets and more
stringent underwriting requirements of commercial lenders on
the liquidity of the U.S. real estate market. Although U.S.
institutional investors may significantly expand their
investments in real estate over the long term, it is doubtful
this will be the case during the next three to five years.
In the interest of analyzing potential new sources of
liquidity over the short term, this thesis looks at how the
lifting of exchange controls and other deregulations in
Sweden might impact the activity of Swedish institutional
investors in U.S. real estate investment.
Shifting Capital Market
The integration of the world's economies and financial
markets, facilitated by advances in information technology,
has significantly increased the awareness of worldwide
investment alternatives. In the past several years, the
world has seen huge international flows of capital,
indicating an acceptance by foreign investors of this
expanded universe of investment alternatives. Having the
option to choose, foreign investors have invested enormous
sums in the U.S. economy, either through portfolio
investments or direct investments in U.S. industries,
including real estate.
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Some of the reasons these foreign investors have been
attracted to the U.S. include high rates of return; a large
and diverse market offering investments ranging from U.S.
Treasury bonds to regional shopping malls; a deep market that
ensures an abundance of buyers for almost any investment held
for future disposition; a stable government; a highly skilled
labor force; and a less onerous tax system.1 Other external
1 Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: The New International Landlords, p. vii
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influences which have contributed to the increase in foreign
investment are exchange rate differentials working in favor
of investors holding other currencies; the U.S. trade
deficit, which has produced tremendous liquidity for some
countries to fund U.S. acquisitions; and a loosening of
restrictive foreign investment regulations by some nations. 2
This inflow of foreign capital has had important
implications for U.S. real estate. Like all other categories
of foreign direct investment in the U.S., foreign real estate
holdings have grown rapidly in recent years. According to
the National Association of Realtors (NAR), between 1982 and
1989, the value of foreign direct investment in U.S. real
estate more than quadrupled, from $11.4 billion to $46
billion.
Nonetheless, other forms of domestically generated
investment grew even faster, so foreign investment's market
share actually declined between 1982 and 1988, from 22.2% to
16.3%. There is evidence that continued shifting of capital
market flows such as this will bring about important changes
in the area of U.S. real estate investment. For example,
there are signs that foreign investors are backing away from
the U.S. as the automatic repository for their money. In the
first half of 1990, offshore investors sold a net $7 billion
2 Dalton & DeMoss, pp. 14 - 17
3 McMahan, John, Real Estate Issues, Fall/Winter 1990
of U.S. stocks and spent just over $10 billion on direct
investment, a quarter of what they invested a year earlier.4
Furthermore, within the United States, injudicious
lending on the part of commercial banks, S&Ls, and insurance
companies during the past ten years has resulted in serious
crises in each of their industries and a sudden demureness as
players in the capital market. More specifically, some of
the major sources of capital behind the real estate boom of
the 1980's have been seen to be retreating. As of July,
1990, institutional investors were looking to withdraw more
than $1.9 billion from open-end commingled real estate funds,
amid fears that the appraised values of the underlying
properties were inflated.5
A more recent trend triggered by the declining real
estate market shows several pension funds actually
liquidating their property investments and reducing
allocations to real estate in favor of other asset classes.
Two examples of this growing trend are a reduction of the
real estate allocation of Xerox Corp.'s pension fund from 10%
to 7% and an asset allocation study for the New Hampshire
Retirement System recommending a sharp reduction in the
funds' current 10% target for real estate.6
4 Kahn, Management Review, March 1991
5 Hemmerick, Pensions & Investments, August 6, 1990
6 Hemmerick, Pensions & Investments, March 4, 1991
Life insurance activity in real estate has slumped as
well. New commercial mortgage commitments by the twenty
largest companies declined from a high of $24.1 billion in
1986 to roughly $22 billion in 1989, and dropped a further
36% to $14 billion in 1990.7
The Japanese, one of the largest sources of foreign
capital in the U.S. real estate market in the late 1980's,
have also started reducing their investments in this sector.
According to the accounting firm Kenneth Leventhal & Co.,
Japanese real estate investment in the U.S. dropped $13
billion between 1988 and 1990, a 27% decrease.8 One of the
main reasons for this shift is a requirement for higher
yields brought about by an increase in the cost of capital in
Japan, which jumped from 2.5% in 1988 to over 6% in 1990.
Significant declines in the Japanese stock market, the
increasing allure of European investment, and poor market
conditions in the U.S. have also caused the inflow of
Japanese capital to ebb.
7 American Council of Life Insurance, Washington D.C.
8 Yamaguchi, Yuzo and Carey, Condn, "The Burst Bubble Blues", Economic World, June
1991, p. 23
Investments by Deregulated Foreign Funds
The investment behavior of a few institutional investors
in Sweden provide compelling evidence that capital placement
in foreign real estate will indeed increase during the next
three to five years. In 1989, exchange-control regulations
in Sweden were relaxed, making it possible for Swedish
investors to invest in foreign shares, bonds, and real
estate.
Following this, the Swedish insurance company Skandia,
one of the largest insurance companies in Europe and Sweden's
biggest private owner of real estate, purchased an
international property portfolio, with properties in the
U.K., Spain, and Portugal valued at approximately $635
million. Roughly 23% of the overall group portfolio of
SKr15l billion ($23 billion) 9 is invested in real estate, of
which international real estate represents 12%, or roughly
2.75% of the overall portfolio. According to two of the
company's investment managers, there are plans to divest a
portion of the domestic portfolio and increase the
international real estate allocation to meet the company's
diversification objectives.
9 To give some order of magnitude to amounts in Swedish kronor and Dutch guilders,
the following exchange rates have been used throughout this thesis: one dollar
converts to 6.5 Swedish kronor or 2 Dutch guilders. As these rates are more or less
reflective of 1991 rates, krona and guilder amounts shown for previous years may not
be accurate when converted to dollars.
10
Since 1989, the National Swedish Pension Fund (AP), with
total capital of SKr400 billion ($61.5 billion), has been
allowed to invest in real estate through a property company
it acquired that same year. Through the acquisition of this
company (Anders Nisses), AP added real estate valued at SKr4
billion ($615 million) to its portfolio of mostly domestic
bonds. Although only a small percentage of this real estate
portfolio was international (two office buildings in London)
and no further international real estate has been acquired to
date, AP has plans to invest 25% of its 5% allowable real
estate allocation in the international property market, or
SKr5 billion ($769 million).
The investment behavior of another recently de-regulated
European institutional investor would further suggest that at
least a portion of these Swedish funds will flow to foreign
real estate. The General Public Service Pension Fund (ABP)
of the Netherlands, 10 the world's second largest pension fund
after the United States' TIAA-CREF with roughly $82 billion
in assets, has only been allowed to make any overseas
investments (stocks, bonds, or real estate) since 1987, and
this limited to 5% of assets. Roughly half of this
international allocation of $4 billion has been marked for
real estate."
10 Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds (ABP) represents over 1 million workers,
including central and local government civil servants, employees of public utility
companies, and employees in the educational and cultural sectors.
11 Price, Margaret and Curtis Vosti Pensions & Investments, 17 September 1990
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Appeal of U.S. Real Estate
In the past, the U.S. could confidently expect a large
percentage of deregulated foreign capital to flow to its
shores. But why U.S. real estate?
There are a number of reasons why foreign investors have
traditionally chosen to invest large sums in U.S. real
estate. First, foreign investors have been attracted to the
relatively higher rates of return available on U.S. real
estate investments. These rate of return differentials were
traditionally due to market differences such as larger size
and greater depth relative to other real estate markets
around the world. While yields on real estate typically
range between 1% to 2% in Japan and 4% to 6% in Europe,
yields of 8% to 10% have not been uncommon for existing
income producing property in the U.S. 12
Second, the lower cost of capital available to many
foreign investors, particularly the Japanese, further
enhanced these rates of return. As mentioned above, in 1988,
the Japanese cost of capital was approximately 2.5%, compared
to roughly 10% in the U.S.
12 Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: Status. Trends. and Outlook, 1988, joint
project, National Association of Realtors and MIT's Center for Real Estate
Development, p. 7
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Third, the decline in the value of the dollar in recent
years has made prices of dollar-denominated assets appear
very low. This becomes an even stronger factor for real
estate investments because U.S. real estate prices, even
without favorable exchange rates, are often far lower than
prices in the home markets of foreign investors.
Fourth, the sheer enormity of the U.S. market has
ensured a high level of liquidity. Foreign institutional
investors such as British and Dutch pension funds have for
several years created a huge demand for high quality downtown
office properties. The commercial real estate boom of the
1980's brought an ever greater supply of such properties to
market. Furthermore, the depth of the U.S. market has
enabled these properties to turn over on a more regular basis
than properties in many overseas markets. Foreign investors
have found they not only have more opportunities to make such
investments, but also have been reassured knowing that a deep
market exists should they need to liquidate their holdings.
Fifth, most foreign investors have viewed the U.S. real
estate market as a safe haven for capital. Many of these
investors have experienced tremendous losses of financial
assets during time of war or domestic turmoil. The U.S. real
estate market offers a haven for capital in the form of a
physical asset that is likely to survive in spite of economic
or military upheavals.
13
Sixth, some foreign investors have experienced high
inflation in their domestic economies. Fixed-income assets,
a traditional staple of many European pension funds, are
generally a poor inflation-hedge compared to real estate
investments. Inflation in the U.S. has hovered around 4% for
most of the 1980's.
Seventh, by virtue of its size, the U.S. real estate
market offers a tremendous opportunity for foreign investors
to learn about new techniques for acquiring, financing, and
managing commercial real estate.
Eighth, the U.S. tax code has offered some significant
advantages to foreign investors in relation to the tax
treatment they would receive at home on similar investments.
For example, even though the recovery period for commercial
real estate was extended from 19 years to 31.5 years in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the depreciation deductions are still
more beneficial to Japanese investors who face a 65 year
recovery period back home.13
Finally, higher savings rates abroad, including pension
fund surpluses, have often exceeded domestic investment needs
and have encouraged institutions to seek opportunities for
capital placement overseas.
13 Foreign Investment in U.S. Real Estate: The New International Landlords, pp. 15-17
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All told, Swedish institutional investors comprise
approximately SKrl.34 trillion ($206 billion) in assets.14
Assuming a 1% allocation to U.S. real estate and three to
five year placement objectives, the U.S. could theoretically
expect to see $2 billion of investment flow to its real
estate markets during this period of time. 15  However, there
are additional factors which will influence the ultimate
placement of these funds.
This thesis looks at the historical and emerging
investment patterns of Swedish institutional investors, as
well as the socio-political trends in the European market,
and questions whether the characteristics which have
traditionally contributed to the appeal of the U.S. real
estate market as discussed above are still strong enough to
attract these deregulated funds. The thesis considers the
future investment strategies of Swedish institutional
investors and the effect they might have on the U.S. real
estate market in the coming three to five years.
14 SKr800 billion in pension funds and SKr540 billion in insurance companies and
private pensions
15 Apparently, the AP Funds have tentatively established a maximum allocation to U.S.
real estate over the next three years which is equivalent to .25% of total assets;
Trygg-Hansa, 1.6% of group assets (including Trygg Life). The total portfolio of all
Dutch pension funds and insurance companies is approximately Fl.500 billion ($250
billion), of which Fl.17 billion ($8.5 billion), or 3.4%, is in U.S. real estate.
(VastGoedMarkt, Amsterdam) This information is only included to give perspective to
the investment potential of Swedish institutional investors. It is not an estimate of
what actually will be invested in U.S. real estate.
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CHAPTER TWO - SWEDISH PENSION SYSTEM
Introduction
Swedish retirement benefits are composed entirely of
government social security payments and compulsory employer
plans. Of 19 countries analyzed in a study conducted by
Business Insurance, Sweden, a country with 8.5 million
inhabitants, was found to replace 85% of factory workers'
final earnings, the third highest percentage after Spain's
91% and Singapore's 87%. The United States, by comparison,
replaces approximately 77% of factory workers' final
earnings, 27% by Social Security, 50% by private pensions.
Sweden had the second highest retirement benefits for middle
managers and executives, replacing 79% and 75% of their final
earnings respectively.
The socialist orientation of the Swedish political
system has had a great deal of influence on the structure of
the Swedish pension fund system as it stands today. As early
as the 1940's, the Liberal Party had considered various
proposals of joint ownership and profit sharing. In the mid-
1950's, the Minister of Finance launched proposals for
collective company savings for employees with the principal
aim of improving the prospects of wage restraint, enabling
workers to exert an influence in enterprise, and ensuring
1 Winston, Paul D. "Pension Income Worldwide", Business Insurance, 18 February 1991
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economic progress. Finally, in 1959, the Swedish Parliament
introduced a State system of statutory general supplementary
pensions (the ATP scheme). The following year, the AP Fund
was established to manage the fund created by these
supplementary contributions.
The AP Fund is divided into three separate management
boards (hereafter referred to as the first three AP funds).
The first AP fund board manages the pension insurance
premiums paid in by the state, local government, and related
institutions and companies; the second fund board manages the
premiums paid in by large business enterprises in the private
sector; and the third board manages premiums paid in by small
private sector employers and the self-employed. The members
and deputy members of these boards are nominated by various
employer and employee associations,2 and are appointed by the
government.
How the State Pension Scheme Works
Within the Swedish ATP scheme, the collection of
premiums is delegated to a special insurance administration.
Each year, this insurance administration transfers
supplementary pension contributions 3 and profit taxes 4 to the
2 Including the powerful blue-collar Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), Sweden's
largest labor union.
3 Supplementary pension contributions are paid by various bodies, including the
state, local authorities, private companies, cooperatives, and foundations. The
portion of yields from the AP Funds not required to fund dibursements are maintained
within the AP Funds. All yields from subsequent AP Funds (the 4th and 5th funds) and
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AP Fund. As premiums paid into the ATP scheme are intended
to cover current social security and supplementary pension
disbursement requirements, the role of the AP Fund is merely
to act as a buffer between premium income and pension
liabilities .5
From their inception, the first three AP funds were
allowed to invest almost exclusively in Swedish bonds.
However, the categories of assets in which they are entitled
to invest have been steadily expanded to include real estate
(foreign as well as Swedish, but limited to 5% of total
assets) and direct loans to business enterprises. With
effect from 1990, they have also been entitled to invest in
foreign interest-bearing securities, but with an upper limit
on foreign purchases of 10% of their assets. Funds managed
by the first three AP funds at the end of 1990 were valued at
nearly SKr400 billion ($61.5 billion).
In 1974, a fourth fund board was instituted within the
AP Fund, and in 1988, a fifth. The establishment of these
funds made it possible to broaden the placement rights of the
system to include equities and other securities on venture
Wage-Earner Investment Funds are also transferred into the first, second, and third AP
Funds.
4 Almost all Swedish enterprises were subject to these taxes, including foreign-owned
Swedish companies, such as Svenska IBM and Svenska Shell.
5 In other words, the state pension system is unfunded or "pay-as-you-go". During
the 1980's, roughly 20% of pension liabilities were financed out of interest income
generated by the first three AP Funds.
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capital markets, in addition to investments made by the first
three AP funds in interest-bearing securities. Investment in
real estate by the fourth and fifth funds is limited to
indirect holdings through the Swedish stock market. Funds
managed by the fourth and fifth AP funds total approximately
SKr22 billion ($3.4 billion), less than 6% of the first three
AP funds.
In 1983, Swedish parliament also approved the creation
of five other funds within the ATP scheme, called wage-earner
funds or employee investment funds. These funds were
allotted SKr2 billion ($300 million) annually, up to and
including 1990. The management boards of each of the wage-
earner funds were required to invest in Swedish enterprises
in the manufacturing and related sectors, with the
fundamental aim of improving the supply of risk capital to
these sectors. Funds managed by the five wage-earner fund
boards is approximately SKr21 billion ($3.25 billion).
The fourth and fifth AP funds and the five wage-earner
funds were funded through the supplementary contributions and
profit taxes paid into the first three AP funds. They are
required to transfer 3% of the value of the funds
(recalculated in accordance with changes in the CPI) they
administer back to the first three AP funds each accounting
period. Therefore, a 3% real rate of return is their
threshold required return.
19
Diagram 1, Structure of the National Swedish Pension
Fund,, illustrates in broad terms the roles of each of the
funds.
Diagram-1
Structure of the National Swedish Pension Fund
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of the fourth, fifth, and wage-earner
indicative of the growing influence of labor in the
private sector. The fourth and fifth management boards
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include roughly equal proportions of representatives from
employer and employee associations. Almost 70% of wage-
earner board members, on the other hand, must represent the
interests of wage-earners.
Politics Behind the Wage-Earner Funds
Although the value of the funds managed by the five
wage-earner funds is relatively small ($3.25 billion), the
pressures behind their evolution are indicative of a greater
political turmoil which appears to be reaching a head in
1991. Because both the AP Funds and the wage-earner funds
stand to be significantly changed by any resolution, these
pressures are worth looking at more closely.
A great deal of Sweden's production is located in the
mining, steel, and shipbuilding sectors and is particularly
dependent upon imported oil. Therefore, during the
international economic crisis of the 1970's, Sweden was
doubly hit by rising oil prices and slowing growth of the
traditional heavy industries. At a point where industry
should have expanded by 5% or 10% to cope with the rising oil
prices, Sweden's production level fell by roughly the same
amount. High corporate profits in the early 1970's led to
very rapid wage increases, which, combined with the pegging
of the Swedish krona to the rising Deutschmark, further
impaired the competitiveness of Swedish industry.
21
In 1982, the Social Democrats redirected economic policy
with a view to making industry and commerce more competitive
and boosting investment, employment, and production. As
industrial profitability increased, however, due partly to a
16% devaluation of the Swedish krona, they were determined to
stabilize the relationship between, on one hand, rising
profits and increasing self-finance in enterprise, and, on
the other, the growth of prices and costs. Yet, the Social
Democrats felt that Sweden should avoid using unemployment as
a weapon against inflation, which they perceived other OECD 6
countries were doing. They believed that such strategies
would undermine the spirit of "consensus" that had
contributed to Sweden's prosperity for so long and would lead
to lower levels of industrial output.
The Social Democrats saw it as their task to spread
power and ownership so that more people would participate in
the accumulation of wealth. This would make it possible to
restrain rising costs and accelerate growth, and at the same
time intensify pressures for equitable distribution of
resources. This, they hoped, would go far in stabilizing the
economy and was the driving force behind the wage-earner fund
proposals .'
6 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
7 Similarities can be drawn with the U.S. experience. As the population has grown
and the economy has shifted from labor intensive to capital intensive, many Americans
believe that the economy should be restructured so that all households will eventually
produce an expanding proportion of their incomes through their privately owned capital
and simultaneously generate enough purchasing power to consume the economy's output.
As a result, there has been an increasing growth of "democratic financing methods",
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In reversing the downturn in the Swedish economy, they
believed that four requirements would have to be met to
guarantee enduring industrial growth:
1) That production, investment, and employment must take
priority over consumption, and that, in this context, the
future development of costs would prove decisive.
2) That inflation would have to be reduced from 8% to 4% by
the end of 1984.
3) That both the necessary burdens and the sought-after
rewards of the production effort must be fairly distributed
among different sectors of the community.
4) That
supply of
long-term
focus on
potential
enduring industrial growth presupposes a steady
risk capital and that this should be available on a
basis, should be of national origin, and should
the sections of Swedish industry which have
for development.
The employee investment funds were seen to contribute to
these ends as follows:
23
such as Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOP) . Like the Swedish wage-earner funds,
the value of ESOPs is their natural tendency to finance capital ownership for
economically underpowered individuals at the same time that they finance corporate
growth. (Kelso)
* Employee investment funds could help reduce conflicts of
a distributional nature and improve the ability of the
employees' organizations to help maintain a high level of
profitability.
e The funds could help, primarily through their profit
sharing, break the pattern whereby high profits always tended
to be accompanied by substantial wage increases, which in
turn led to higher inflation and a deterioration of growth
potential.
* The appearance of the funds as buyers in the stock
market would increase the supply of capital. This would
counteract the tendency of rising demand for risk capital to
elevate yield requirements, which could inhibit the expansive
capacity of enterprise.
- The funds would give workers direct responsibility for
the investment of risk capital and, at the same time, would
give them a share in future profits and greater influence
within enterprise. This would hopefully resolve some of the
powerful conflicts existing between capital and labor. 8
Today, the Swedish government, together with the Swedish
Trade Union Confederation (LO), wants to further strengthen
8 In fact, the introduction of the wage earner funds was partially in response to
demands made by the LO for greater control over industry.
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the role of the state pension funds in the private sector by
allowing the first three AP Funds, set up in 1960, to invest
directly in the stock market. As mentioned above, the fourth
and fifth funds were set up primarily as conduits for pension
fund investment into the Swedish stock market.
Swedish industry, however, remains firmly committed to
the private sector. Many company executives argue that an
increased presence of the AP Funds in the stock market will
prove an unacceptable extension of public power into company
ownership structures. 9 The Federation of Swedish Industries
believes that pension funds should first be privatised before
their investment role expands.
At the end of 1989, the total surplus of the first three
funds equalled roughly 43% of the total valuation of the
Stockholm bourse. 10 The fourth and fifth funds, together with
the wage-earner funds, own around 8% of the capital and
voting shares in Sweden's top 50 stock market listed
companies. Moreover, the wage-earner funds are required to
transfer 50% of the voting rights conferred by their
shareholding in a company to the local trade union
organizations in that company if they so request.
9 Taylor, Robert "A Share of the Corporate Action" Financial Times, p. 30, 12
October 1990
10 In the U.S., total outstanding equities owned by .aLL U.S. institutional investors
was 39.4% for the first quarter, 1991. (45.9% including foreign institutional
investors) (Tobin, NYSE)
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In the run-up to the elections in September, 1991, polls
show that the Social Democrats' popularity has fallen to
approximately 30% (nearly a 15% drop since last year) in
favor of various parties further to the right.
Although no one is certain how the Swedish pension fund
system will be affected by the outcome of these elections, a
few thoughts have been put forward during the course of my
interviews. If the conservatives take control, they may look
for ways to dissolve the five wage-earner funds and loosen
the tightening grip of labor in the private sector. However,
they wouldn't be able to liquidate the funds, as the stock
market is not large enough to absorb their positions.
Furthermore, although it is clear that the funds belong to
"the people", it is not clear how proceeds of these funds
would be divvied up in the event of liquidation. If the
Social Democrats win, some people feel that the wage-earner
funds would be combined with the AP Funds.
Situation Today
Unlike the situation during most of the 1980's, Sweden's
premium income in 1990 was able to cover almost all of the
year's pension liabilities. However, this was due to a 2%
drop in liabilities and an increase in the premium rates
during that year. During the past ten years, the government
has had to draw nearly 20% of annual liabilities, which
26
totalled SKr77.4 billion in 1990 ($11.9 billion), from the AP
fund's annual yield.
According to AP fund executives, due to the increasing
number of pensioners and the sluggish growth of the Swedish
economy, the premium rate today (13%) will not be sufficient
to cover future pensions. Therefore, they project that the
fund yields will once again be appropriated to a large extent
to finance pension disbursements.
Against this background, AP fund executives feel it is
to their advantage that their investment possibilities have
been expanded to include real estate and foreign bonds. This
is especially important because Sweden's pension liabilities
are linked to real wages up until the time of retirement.
Investment in real estate will enable the fund to more
closely tie yields to real values.
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CHAPTER THREE
SWEDISH INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
In Sweden and some other European countries, investment
assets are split into two categories: "real", which are
assumed to be inflation-linked, and "nominal", which are
assumed not to be. The classification of some assets as real
has created substantial controversy in Sweden and many
institutions are pushing for change. To facilitate reading
the text which follows, I have included broad definitions of
real and nominal assets for reference:
Real Assets
- Equities
- quoted (stocks and convertible bonds)
- unquoted (partnerships)
- Real Estate
- including sale-leasebacks1
Nominal Assets
- bonds and all other fixed-interest bearing
instruments, including overnight lending
Furthermore, it is useful to know the tax status of
Swedish institutional investors:
State pension tax-exempt
Life-insurance companies 15% - 17% on realized net income2
Non-life companies 30% on profit
1 Sale-leaseback payments in Sweden are typically based on a real interest rate of
3.5% plus the inflation rate for the year.
2 Difference between the book value of an asset and the value of its sale.
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Property Taxes:
Valuations every 5 years
Assessment Ratio 75% of market value3
Ad Valorem Tax Rate 3.5% (expected to fall to 2.5% by 1992)
A look at the recent investment patterns of Swedish
institutional investors will help explain how they might
invest in the U.S. market in the future.
Swedish Institutional Investors
To understand the general investment strategies of some
Swedish institutional investors, I have looked at the
aggregate asset allocations of the National Swedish Pension
Fund (AP) , as well as SPP-Trygg-Hansa (Trygg) , the second
largest private insurance company in Sweden, and Trygg Life,
its affiliated life insurance company.
These investors are of particular interest since they
have recently formed a partnership for investment in North
American real estate, including Trygg (45%), AP (45%),
Grosvenor, Vancouver (5%), and Lundbergs (a Swedish-owned
development company) (5%). AP and Trygg have chosen to link
up with Lundbergs and Grosvernor, both well-established in
the U.S. market, because they feel it is the best way for
them to break into and learn the U.S. market. Trygg and AP
3 The assessed valuation of property has typically been expressed as some fraction of
this 75%. In 1989, it was 55% of 75%; in 1990, 65% of 75%; and in 1991, increased to
100% of 75%.
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each plan to invest between SKrO.5 - 1 billion ($77 - $154
million) over the next three years in this partnership. All
initial investments will be direct investments, as both
investors believe that indirect investments would not allow
them to learn the market. They feel that they have
sufficiently minimized their risk through the ownership
structure. Due to the particular strengths of the local
partners, the partnership will focus on retail properties.
For a more specific look at real estate investment
patterns, I have looked at a 1989 survey conducted by the
Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm which analyzes the
invesment patterns of Swedish investors in domestic
commercial real estate and draws some comparisons with
American studies. 4 The real estate portfolio of Skandia, the
largest private insurer in Sweden, will provide further
insight into property investment by Swedish institutional
investors. Skandia has indicated that, if they were to enter
the U.S. real estate market, they would do so with another
large U.S. institutional investor.
National Swedish Pension Fund (API
The first three AP funds (hereafter referred to as the
AP Fund) employ 27 employees to manage their SKr400 billion
($61.5 billion) portfolio of assets. With restrictions on
4 Brzeski, J., A. Jaffe, and S. Lundstram Commercial Real Estate Tnvestment Survey
in Sweden,, The Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, 1989, Report 5:29
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investment in equities, real estate, and foreign assets,
investments of the AP Fund have historically been
concentrated in bonds. However, since relaxing these
regulations, the AP Fund has begun adjusting its allocations
away from bonds towards other asset categories, including
real estate. Table 1, AP Fund's Investments by Type, shows
the heavy concentration of the fund's investments in fixed-
income instruments.
Table 1: AP Fund's Investments by Type
1989 1990
Bonds 84% 82%
Promissory Notes 12% 10%
Money Market Investments 2% 3%
Debenture Loans 1% 3%
Properties . 21
Total 100% 100%
Activity in the money and bond markets constitutes an
integral part of the fund's overall investment strategy for
interest-bearing instruments. The fund's objective is to
ensure that the portfolio holds an optimal combination of
interest risk, credit risk, and liquidity. To even out
swings in AP Fund's liquidity and to take advantage of
temporary pricing errors, the forward market is used in the
management of the portfolio.
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In 1990, investments in housing bonds accounted for the
largest part of the fund's net investments. Table 2, AE
Fund's Investments by Category of Borrower, shows that, at
the end of the year, the housing sector's share of interest
bearing investments was roughly 57%.5
Table 2: AP Fund's Investments by Category of Borrower
1989 1990
Housing 59% 57%
State 22% 21%
Corporate 13% 14%
Local Authorities 3% 3%
Money Market Investments 2% 3%
Properties 1% 2%
Total 100% 100%
Such a large allocation to mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) contrasts sharply with the typical allocation of a U.S.
institutional investor. Table 3, Mortgage-Backed Securities
as % of Total Portfolio, compares the approximate MBS
holdings of the AP Fund and Trygg-Hansa Holding, 6 a large
private insurer in Sweden, with those of U.S. institutional
investors7 .
5 Housing finance has increasingly become integrated within general credit markets in
Sweden. High real interest rates have attracted corporate retained earnings to
mortgage finance, inducing an increased use of mortgage-backed securities, interest
rate swaps, options and futures. (Lundstrbm)
6 Data from: The National Swedish Pension Fund 1990 Annual Report and Trygg-Hansa
Holding 1989 Annual Report, Stockholm
7 Hollie, Leonard J. "Mortgage Securities Lure Insurers, Banks" Pensions &
Investments, p. 50, 25 June 1990
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Table 3: Mortgage-Backed Securities as % of Total Portfolio
1989
AP Fund 54.9%
Trygg-Hansa Holding 25.5%
U.S. Insurance Companies 10.0%
U.S. Commercial Banks8  3.5%
Calpers 9 12.5%
Groups traditionally targeted for direct lending by AP
Fund include local authorities and municipal companies.
However, during the last few years, new financing
alternatives in the form of municipal papers and borrowing in
foreign currencies have caused margins to shrink in this
market.
In 1990, AP Fund's holding of debenture loans increased
by approximately 7%. The majority of the growth in this area
occured within the banking sector as a result of revised
capital ratio regulations, which will scale up to 8% by 1993.
At the end of 1990, the requirement was 7.25%.
The AP Fund was first allowed to invest in real estate
in 1989, with stipulations that it could only hold real
estate or shares in real estate companies. It can not own
8 Represents holdings at end of 1st quarter, 1989; this figure rose to 5.3% a year
later.
9 California Public Employees' Retirement System, second largest U.S. pension fund at
end of 1990 with roughly $54 billion in assets.
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shares in construction companies.1 0  During this year, it
acquired the listed real estate company Anders Nisses AB for
SKr4 billion ($615 million) and also bought into a newly
formed real estate company, Pleiad Real Estate AB. As
described earlier, Anders Nisses' portfolio included two
office buildings in London, the only foreign properties held
by the AP Fund to date. One of the London properties is Four
Millbank, a completely renovated 19th century classical
revival office building located near the Houses of
Parliament.
In 1990, three large property deals were concluded by
the AP Fund in Sweden, including two office properties
purchased for SKr560 million ($86 million) and the purchase
of the domestic property holdings of Esselte, the Swedish
office products and media group. Although analysts had
judged Esselte's property, which included prime sites in
Stockholm and Gothenburg, to be worth around SKr2.5 billion,
the AP Fund paid SKr3.4 billion ($523 million) .11
Total real estate investments in 1989 and 1990 were
SKr9.7 billion ($1.5 billion). However, the market value of
the AP Fund property holdings had fallen to approximately
SKr8.2 billion ($1.25 billion) at the end of 1990, with
10 The property development function in Sweden has traditionally been integrated
within construction companies.
11 Burton, John "Esselte Sells its Property Holdings in Restructure" Financial
Times, p. 27, 13 June 1990
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rental income for 1991 estimated at SKr455 million ($70
million) in Sweden and SKr50 million ($7.7 million) in
England. Distribution of the AP Fund's real estate by method
of investment is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: AP Fund's Real Estate by Method of Investment
1989 1990
Direct Investment 90% 64%
Shares in Real Estate Cos. 5% 4%
Partnerships 5% 32%
Total 100% 100%
In 1990, the AP Fund's overall portfolio had a total
yield of 14%, including a current yield of 12.4% and capital
appreciation of 1.6%. A weakening property market in 1990
resulted in a 10.9% drop in the value of the real estate
portfolio. According to the management board, real estate's
current yield of 3.6% was unusually low because a substantial
amount of the portfolio was in the earlier phases of
development. 12 Charts 2, 3, and 4 show the AP Fund's current
yields and changes in value 3 by investment type since 1987.
12 The National Swedish Pension Fund (First, Second, and Third Fund Boards), Annual
Review 1990
13 According to recommendations by the Swedish insurance industry, this value and all
other change of values indicated in subsequent tables consist of the market value at
the beginning of the year plus half the net investment minus half the yield.
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Chart 4: AP Fund's Total Return
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Trygg-Hansa Holdine
Trygg-Hansa Holding's investments are distributed among
real estate, shares, bonds, short-term investments and
various types of deposits. Their combined value at the end
of 1989 was approximately SKr20 billion ($3 billion),
excluding Trygg Life.
Traditionally, Trygg-Hansa has grouped its assets into
real and nominal assets, in order to achieve an optimal risk-
return profile for the portfolio. As mentioned at the
beginning of the chapter, real assets are assumed to be
inflation-linked, and nominal assets aren't.
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In order to minimize capital losses from high inflation,
Trygg-Hansa adopted a strategy in the 1980's which raised the
proportion of real assets in their portfolio. 14 Between 1985
and 1989, the market value of all investments increased by an
average of 18%, while the corresponding increase for shares
and real estate alone was more than 30%. Between 1980 and
1989, the combined value of shares and real estate rose from
12% of total investment assets to 55%.
Unlike the National Swedish Pension Fund (AP), Swedish
insurance companies had been allowed to invest in real estate
before 1989 and had always been allowed to invest in shares
provided their holdings of any one company did not exceed 5%.
However, like AP, they have only been permitted to make
foreign investments since 1989. Therefore, tofurther
diversify the portfolio and link movements in the value of
their investments more closely with those of the
international economy, Trygg-Hansa increased the proportion
of foreign assets in its portfolio from 0 % to 16% by the end
of 1989. This trend towards foreign investment has been
carried out primarily in the real estate and shares
categories.
As of 1991, Trygg-Hansa's broad investment policy is 50%
real assets, 50% nominal assets, with a real estate
14 Office building rents from the Stockholm market rose by 54% during the period
1982-85, roughly twice the rate of inflation during the same period.
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allocation of 15%. Within the real asset categories, more
and more of the investments will be foreign. Trygg-Hansa's
investments in Swedish stocks, for example, will continue to
decrease in coming years in favor of foreign shares.15
Although the 15% allocation to real estate probably will not
change, a portion of the domestic real estate portfolio will
be sold to accommodate planned expansion in foreign property
holdings. The standing policy regarding foreign real estate
investment is to purchase commercial property only and to
hold long term.
Part of Trygg-Hansa's decision to increase its foreign
real estate holdings stems from its broad diversification
strategy. However, the poor general outlook for Sweden's
economy in the 1990's and increasing real estate tax burdens
provide further incentive to look for higher returns abroad.
In early 1989, a rapidly heating real estate market in
Stockholm prompted officials to levy an investment charge of
10% of building costs on certain new construction. More
recently, as mentioned above, the effective tax rate on
property has increased from 1.44% of market value in 1989 to
2.63% in 1991.
These tax increases must have been painful for Trygg-
Hansa. At the end of 1989, 95% of their nearly SKr3 billion
15 Trygg-Hansa (including SPP) owns between 6% and 7% of shares traded on the Swedish
stock exchange.
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property portfolio was located in Sweden, as shown in Table
5, Trygg-Hansa's Property Portfolio by Location. 16
Table 5: Trvaa-Hansa's Property Portfolio by Location
Central Stockholm
Rest of Stockholm
Rest of Sweden
London
53%
26%
16%
5%
In 1990, Trygg-Hansa realized a 6% real rate of return
on their overall portfolio.' 7 Table 6, Trygg-Hansa
Investments by Asset Class, shows an increasing proportion of
stocks within the portfolio.
Table 6: Trygg-Hansa Investments by Asset Class
(in millions)
Real Estate
Stocks
Bonds
Loans
Cash
Total
1989
SKr %
2,260 14.4
4,771 30.3
5,119 32.5
1,692 10.7
1,913 12.1
15,755 100.0
2,958 15.0
7,878 40.0
6,066 30.8
2,025 10.3
765
60,472 100.0
Chart 5, Trygg-Hansa 1989 Returns, shows almost equal
total returns in 1989 for Trygg-Hansa's real estate and
stocks.
16 One property in London (Lexicon House, 24,000 sf of commercial space built in
1985, at 82 Charing Cross Road) represents 5% of the market value of the entire real
estate portfolio. This would put the value of the building at roughly $23 million.
17 Sweden's 12-month consumer price inflation was 10.9% in June, 1991.
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Chart 5: Trygg-Hansa 1989 Returns
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In 1990, Trygg-Hansa only realized a total return of
7.7% on it real estate portfolio, of which 4.7% was current
yield and 3% was capital appreciation.
Trvaa Life
Trygg Life is a mutual company, which means among other
things that it is owned by its policy holders. It owns 27%
of the capital and 63% of the voting rights in Trygg-Hansa
Holding AB and is thus its largest individual shareholder.
Much of Trygg Life's investment strategy resembles that
of Trygg-Hansa. However, where Trygg-Hansa's investment
assets totalled roughly SKr20 billion at the end of 1989,
Trygg Life's were over SKr60 billion ($9.2 billion).
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Furthermore, where SPP-Trygg-Hansa held 16% of its portfolio
in foreign assets at the end of 1989, Trygg Life only held
5.5% in foreign assets. Additionally, while Trygg Life's
ratio between real and nominal assets is the same (55% and
45% respectively), its allocation between individual asset
categories is different. For example, as a life company,
Trygg Life does not have the liquidity requirements of its
non-life affiliate1 8 and therefore can afford to make a higher
allocation to real estate, nearly 20% compared to Trygg-
Hansa's 15%.19 Table 7, Trygg Life Investments by Asset
Class, reflects growing proportions of stocks and real estate
within Trygg Life's overall portfolio.
Table 7: Trygg Life Investments by Asset Class
(in millions) 1988 1989
SKr 
_9S1r
Real Estate 9,640 18.5 11,955 19.8
Stocks 16,237 31.2 22,100 36.5
Bonds 20,608 39.6 20,298 33.6
Loans 2,751 5.3 2,664 4.4
Cash 2,778 5.3 3,55 5.7
Total 52,014 100.0 60,472 100.0
18 Although there are no legal liquidity requirements for insurance companies in
Sweden, casualty and reinsurance activities generally require higher liquidity and
stronger cash flows than life activities. In Italy, on the other hand, insurance
companies are legally required to hold at least 16 different types of assets. In
Germany, at least 10 types, with no more than 50% in bonds. (Lundkvist)
19 However, at the end of 1989, only one property was owned outside Sweden; a 63,000
sf office building built in 1987 at 77 Shaftesbury Avenue in London.
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Chart 6, Trygg-Life 1989 Returns, reflects 1989 returns
almost identical to Trygg-Hansa
Chart 6: Trygg-Life 1989 Returns
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Survey of Swedish Investors
A study published in 1989 by the Department of Real
Estate Economics at The Royal Institute of Technology in
Stockholm (the study will be referred to as the JAS study)
looks at the investment patterns of Swedish investors in
income-producing real estate. 20  The survey instrument
consisted of a questionnaire sent to 350 companies, and
generated information concerning the structure of real estate
portfolios, the use of analytical techniques, various
investment concerns, and operational methods used in the
acquisition, monitoring, and disposition of real estate
20 Brzeski, Jaffe, & Lundstr6m Commercial Real Estate Investment in Sweden
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investments. Of the 228 respondents, 14 (7%) were pension
funds or insurance companies. The following findings pertain
only to these investor categories.
Not surprisingly, all pension and insurance respondents
held high concentrations of commercial properties in their
portfolios.21 While over 90% also held apartments, they did
so in considerably smaller proportions. Industrial space,
shopping centers, and hotels were also held by more than 25%
of the respondents.
The major business objective sought by 71% of the
respondents for their real estate investments was capital
placement. Nonetheless, 43% also cited property management
as a business objective or profit center, and 14% value-
enhancing renovating or remodeling.
Long-term real return on equity was ranked as the number
one investment goal of the pension and insurance companies
who responded. Risk diversification and capital appreciation
were second and third. The relative unimportance of current
return on equity may reflect greater emphasis on the capital
appreciation potential of real estate. Tax benefits were not
21 Between 1981 and 1987, prices for the best investment-grade properties increased
at the rate of 100% every three years and reached $770 per square foot at central
Stockholm locations in 1987. (Lundstr6m)
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important as most pension funds and life insurance companies
are tax exempt and are all-equity investors by law.
By comparison, a study conducted by Louargand & Taylor
in the United States in 199022 reveals that the 118 U.S.
pension plan sponsors and advisors who responded ranked total
expected return as the number one real estate portfolio
performance goal. However, unlike the JAS study, most
respondents placed much more importance on the current yield
portion of total return. Where 42 respondents ranked cash
flow from operations as their first or second most important
performance goal (on a scale of 7), only 14 ranked potential
for high appreciation as heavily. However, because of the
timing of this study, these results are probably a reflection
of current market conditions, where real estate investors are
experiencing negative capital appreciation.
Interestingly, the recent acquisition trends of the
respondents to the JAS study revealed that industrial space
was the second most desired property type after office
properties, with most of the reported acquisitions transacted
through sale-leasebacks in the industrial category. 2 3
22 Louargand, Marc & Timothy Taylor Institutional Real Estate Portfolio Risk
Manacement Practices, MIT's Center for Real Estate Development, Working Paper #30,
1991
23 There has been considerable interest in sale-leaseback deals in recent years. The
50-year sale-leaseback of Gothenburg harbor, for example, was structured by Trygg with
the municipality of Gothenburg. Although it is of interest to note that the buyback
option is legally unenforceable in Sweden (it constitutes an encumbrance on the title
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Apartments were the third most active category of property
recently invested in, despite a long history of country-wide
rent controls. The authors of the JAS study suggest that
rent controls lead to a lower level of construction and,
subsequently, lower vacancy rates and risk. Another possible
explanation is that many respondents are able to build
apartments with favorable government subsidies and retain the
properties for management and operating profits.
Risk diversification strategies were utilized by only
57% of the Swedish pension and insurance respondents. The
authors of the study attribute part of this to the fact that
the respondents tend to invest in investment-grade prime-
location real estate which implicitly carries the lowest
systematic risk, even though specific risk is still likely to
exist. Of the different strategies favored by those who did
have diversification strategies, property type and geographic
location were used by 63%, portfolio mix by 50%, financial
structure (debt/equity mix) by 25%, and other methods
including ownership structure by 13%.
The Louargand & Taylor study found that 93% of U.S.
respondents made a systematic attempt to diversify risk. Of
these, 83% used property type, and 47% property size as
explicit criteria for diversification. Location was broken
and, as such, is not recognized by the Swedish Land Act), in most cases, such as
this, it is a non-issue.
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down into five categories, with 23% of respondents using both
state and metro area sub-market as criteria, and nearly 38%
using each of the following: region, metropolitan area, and
economic location. Unlike the JAS study, financial and
ownership structures were not specifically offered as
diversification criteria, although these may have been
included in the category other, which was ticked off by 13%
of the respondents.
Eighty-six percent of the JAS study respondents
explicitly adjusted for risk differences across property type
and location prior to an investment decision. Of the
preferred risk adjustment techniques, adjusting expected
benefits downward was the method most preferred by pension
and insurance companies. While all other investor types
responding to the survey 24 preferred increasing the required
return as a risk adjustment technique, the authors of the
survey attribute pension and insurance company preference for
the expected benefit method to policy guidelines stipulating
fixed required rates of return for their real estate
investments.
Table 8, Comparison of U.S. & Swedish Risk Adjustment
Strategies, compares the risk adustment findings of this
study (JAS) with those of a study of 176 U.S. insurance
24 Including publicly traded real estate corporations, construction/development
companies, property holding companies, and foundations.
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companies conducted by James R. Webb in 198425 and Louargand &
Taylor's 1990 study.
Table 8: Comparison of U.S. & Swedish Risk Adjustment Strategies
Louargand/
Webb '84 Taylor '90 JAS '89
Required Return 54/16 42/14 29/21
Expected Benefits 21/17 16/15 29/36
Sensitivity Analysis 21 47/10 29/15
Probability Judgement 18 4/15 15/29
Mean Variance Analysis n/a 7/3 n/a
Beta Coefficients n/a 3/2 n/a
None 21 22 14
Figures are given in percent of respondents. Where two figures are provided,
the first indicates the primary reported technique and the second the secondary
technique. For Louargand's study, the first indicates the percentage of
respondents who often used that method, the second, those who sometimes did.
According to comparisons drawn between the JAS study and
Webb's '84 study, the authors of the JAS study contend that
explicit risk analysis is far more sophisticated and
formalized in Sweden than in the United States. However,
when compared to the findings in Louargand & Taylor's 1990
study, this argument is not as strong. Since 1984, there has
been a marked increase in the use of sensitivity analyses in
the United States. More notable, however, is the increasing
use of the mean variance and beta coefficient techniques,
reflecting a growing acceptance on the part of real estate
professionals to apply Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) in the
systematic analysis of their real estate portfolios.
25 Webb, James R. "Real Estate Investment Acquisition Rules for Life Insurance
Companies and Pension Funds: A Survey", American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association Journal, 12 (1984), pp. 495 - 520
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This increased sophistication can be attributed, at
least in part, to diversification requirements as laid out in
ERISA, which set out new standards of fiduciary care for
private pension plans. 26 Although a growing acceptance of MPT
indicates that those respondents who use explicit
diversification criteria are becoming more sophisticated in
their approach, the percentage of respondents who use no
risk-adjustment techniques has surprisingly stayed the same.
Chart 7, Comparison of Risk Adjustment Techniques, shows the
total percentage of respondents to each survey using each of
the various risk adjustment methods always or sometimes.
Chart 7; Comparison of Risk Adiustment Techniques
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26 Mean variance and beta coefficients were not included as categories in either the
Webb or JAS study. I base my belief on their growing use on the assumption that their
growing use is what warranted their inclusion in the Louargand study.
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Approximately 65% of the Swedish pension and insurance
respondents use between eleven and twenty years as the
holding period for calculating investment returns. This is
consistent with their investment objectives of long-term real
returns on equity capital.
When looking at performance measures, 86% of the Swedish
respondents utilized before-tax criteria. Only 14% (or two
respondents) used after-tax information, reflecting the
favorable tax postion of most pension and insurance companies
in Sweden. Table 9, Performance Measures Preferred by
Swedish Institutional Investors, shows preferences for the
various measures as a percentage of respondents using before-
tax criteria.
Table 9: Performance Measures Preferred by Swedish Institutional
Investors
NOI/Initial Equity 67%
PV of Total Capital 67%
IRR on Total Capital 58%
IRR on Equity 50%
NOI/Price 50%
PV of Equity 42%
Equity Payback 33%
Price/Gross Rents 33%
BTCF/Initial Equity 25%
Compared to a study conducted by Webb in the early
1980's, Louargand & Taylor's study found that respondents
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using cash-on-cash and net present value as performance
measures had dropped from 63% and 48%, to 44% and 11%
respectively. Like Webb's study, Louargand's results showed
a preference (60%) for internal rate of return (IRR). Just
as beta coefficients and mean variances had been introduced
as new categories in risk adjustment methods, more
sophisticated performance measures were included, as well:
partitioned IRR (2%), financial management rate of return
(FMRR) (1%), risk-adjusted performance measure (4%), and
annual holding period return (HPR) (10%).
The primary motive for Swedish pension and insurance
companies investing in smaller cities was higher risk-
adjusted regular returns, presumably to compensate for low
current yields they obtain in metropolitan areas. Higher
potential capital appreciation, diversification, and lack of
metropolitan investment opportunities were less important
reasons.
Respondents to the JAS study were asked how they
searched for information supporting investment decisions in
non-metropolitan areas. Of the 64% who said they were recent
investors in smaller cities, 78% used their own market
knowledge or that of local contacts. Appraisal reports with
cash flow projections were used by 33% of the respondents, as
were local development studies including information on
property prices, economic structure, and population and
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incomes. Only 22% relied on consultant reports and none on
intuition or feel of the market, unlike 20% of the property-
holding and construction companies.
In evaluating their real estate holdings, JAS
respondents relied most heavily on market valuations, both
internally and externally generated. Table 10, Real Estate
Portfolio Valuation Techniques, lists several valuation
methods in descending order of preference.
Table 10: Real Estate Portfolio Valuation Techniques
Internal Market Valuation 71%
External Market Valuation 64%
Budget Feed-Back at Property Level 57%
Return Ratios 36%
Portfolio Review* 29%
Physical Inspections 21%
* Including identification of properties to be sold, readapted, renovated, etc.
When asked to describe their companies' property
management and financial control systems, a surprising 79% of
the Swedish respondents had complete internal property
management, covering all technical and financial aspects,
while only 14% hired external property managers. Table 11,
Property Management Organization in Sweden, reflects some of
the more common organization and control systems used by
Swedish institutional investors in real estate.
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Table 11: Property Management Organization in Sweden
Complete Internal Property Management 79%
Performance Feedback on Property 71%
Formal Plans for Each Property 50%
with time horizon of: 1 year 29%
2 - 5 years 29%
6+ years 7%
Manager Responsible for Each Property 36%
Management Partially Contracted Out 29%
Externally Hired Property Manager 14%
Following a formal comparison of American and Swedish
surveys, the authors of the JAS study suggest that Sweden is
far ahead of the United States in the area of property
management. Although they attribute part of this to lower
turnover rates in Sweden, they propose that property
management in Sweden is a more fundamental part of real
estate decision-making than in the United States. Although
some of their findings might explain this conclusion, such as
high expectations from capital appreciation as a contributor
to total return, greater involvement in property management
on the part of Swedish institutional investors might also be
a function of differences in organization structures and the
relatively small size of the country. Few and proximate
markets, for example, actually encourage the adoption of in-
house property management.
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Skandia
The largest private insurer and owner of real estate in
Sweden, Skandia's assets amounted to roughly SKr151 billion
($23 billion) at the end of 1990, with asset allocation
objectives of 50% nominal and 50% real. Of the 50% real,
their objective is to hold half in shares and half in real
estate. As of 1990, SKr35 billion ($5.4 billion) or 23% of
the portfolio was in real estate.
Also the largest developer in Sweden, Skandia undertakes
nearly SKrl billion ($154 million) in projects each year.27
Chart 8, Skandia's Portfolio of Real Estate by Property Type,
reflects a predominance of commercial and retail properties.
Chart 8: Skandia's Portfolio of Real Estate by Property Type
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27 "Swedes Have a Way With Real Estate", Skandia informational brochure
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The company's approach to real estate investment
supports the theory that property management is a fundamental
part of real estate decision-making in Sweden. Property is
not a speculative investment and is valued by Skandia for
three of its primary investment characteristics: 1) it serves
as a hedge against inflation, 2) it is an asset that can be
actively managed, and 3) it provides diversification for the
overall portfolio. They invest in property to place their
capital and generally have no interest in borrowing.
Skandia's strategy is to act as property owners, project
developers and real estate managers, and to establish close
working relationships with those they work with. They have
in-house management for all domestic and international
properties and are particularly interested in projects which
offer potential for added value through renovation,
expansion, or new construction. They prefer to invest direct
so they can manage their own investment and learn the market.
Of their SKr35 billion combined real estate portfolio
(of which 25% is held by the non-life company, and 75% by the
life company) roughly SKr4.2 billion ($645 million) or 12% is
in foreign real estate. These properties, located in London,
Madrid, and Lisbon, were all purchased in 1989 and are mostly
office and retail properties. Their policy for all future
foreign real estate investment is to purchase well-located,
top-quality, commercial property only. In the future, the
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company plans to reduce their holdings in Swedish real estate
and will be working towards penetrating three main foreign
markets: the U.K., France, and Germany. Within these
countries, they have narrowed their focus to fifteen
cities/regions which they chose because they were large,
liquid, and self-contained markets.
Executives at Skandia have chosen to focus on the
European market before venturing into the U.S. One reason is
that they feel tougher European planning and zoning
restrictions are more likely to protect their investments
than the laxer U.S. restrictions. Furthermore, as part of
the EC, they view Europe as their "home market" and feel that
physical proximity and cultural similarities will make it
easier for them to find their way in foreign property
investment. They have chosen deep markets to justify the
investment they intend to make in learning those markets and
plan on setting up regional management offices.
Part of Skandia's general investment policy is to invest
in currencies in which they have reserves and to match those
reserves with investment assets. For their overall
portfolio, they expect a total return of approximately 14%.
Chart 9, Skandia's Real Estate Returns, reflects total real
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estate returns of nearly 30% before the acquisition of
foreign real estate.28
Chart 9: Skandia's Real Estate Returns
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However, by 1990, the total returns for the non-life and
life companies' real estate portfolios had fallen to 3.85%
and 5% respectively, of which current yield represented 1% in
both portfolios. This dramatic plunge was attributed
primarily to write-downs on property acquired in London the
previous year and large development projects in Spain not yet
generating returns.
28 In determining the capital appreciation portion of returns, Skandia uses the
weighted average of three appraisal methods: market value, replacement cost, and
capitalized cash flow. The last method is weighted most heavily.
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How Are Institutional Investors in Other Countries
Investing?
Although investor behavior in foreign real estate
markets has been found to reflect their behavior at home,29
some investment managers believe that the general investment
patterns of European institutional investors are increasingly
resembling U.S. and U.K. institutional investors as
sophisticated portfolio management techniques reach the
Continent. In The Netherlands, for example, a growing
acceptance of equities and a greater receptiveness to asset
allocation theory is attributed to a more thorough
understanding of U.K. and U.S. research.3 o
If this is true, a comparison of the foregoing profile
of Swedish investment patterns to the investment patterns of
institutional investors in the United States and the U.K.
would be insightful. An example of a Dutch instititutional
investor, Shell Pension Fund Foundation, has been included
for further perspective, primarily because they are widely
recognized as one of the most sophisticated and innovative
fund managers in Continental Europe. As European markets
merge, the theory of market efficiency might indicate that
other European fund managers will not lag far behind in
adopting similar portfolio management techniques. Moreover,
29 Bacow, Lawrence S. The Tnternationalization of the U.S. Real Estate Industry,
MIT's Center for Real Estate Development, WP #16, Section II, November 1988
30 Price, Margaret and Curtis Vosti "Dutch Funds Conquering Fear of Equities"
Pensions & Investments, 17 September 1990
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Shell's investment strategy will offer interesting contrast;
their outlook for real estate investment in the U.S. differs
markedly from that of the U.K.
Pension funds in the U.S. are adopting a very
conservative attitude toward international real estate
investment, even greater than they showed toward domestic
real estate and international stock and bond investing in the
early 1980s. One of the major reasons for their skepticism
stems from their disappointment with the performance of
domestic real estate in their portfolios. Relatively new
players in the area of real estate investment, 3 1 pension funds
had expected long-term returns substantially over the rate of
inflation, yet in 1990, for example, only achieved a total
return of 1.3% on domestic core real estate, according to the
Russell-NCREIF index.
With this backdrop, real estate investment managers are
not selling the virtues of international real estate to U.S.
funds easily. As of May, 1991, only two of eight real estate
money managers offering commingled international realty funds
have signed any U.S. institutional clients. According to
consultants Greenwich Associates, only 2% of 1,016 corporate
pension funds and 3% of 310 public funds have any
international real estate investments. And only another 2%
31 Investment in real estate by U.S. pension funds only took off in the early 1980's,
partly in response to diversification requirements as laid out in ERISA.
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of corporate funds and 4% of public funds have plans to start
investing in international real estate.
This general disappointment with the performance of real
estate has prompted some U.S. funds to reduce their
allocations to this asset class. Eaton Corporation's $1.7
billion pension plan has reduced its real estate allocation
from 15% - 20% to 2% - 3%. Southwestern Bell's $8.3 billion
fund reduced its allocation to 8% - 9% from 10% in 1990.
Throughout the 1980's, U.S pension funds' real estate
portfolios also changed considerably by property-type mix,
reflecting, perhaps, a growing awareness of risk tolerance
levels in the area of real estate. Table 12, U.S. Pension
Fund Portfolios by Property Type, shows decreasing
proportions of offices and hotels, in favor of retail
property, multifamily and land.32
Table 12: U.S. Pension Fund Portfolios by Property Type
1983 1989
Offices 50% 38%
Retail 20% 27%
Industrial 19% 19%
Hotels 6% 2%
Multifamily 3% 9%
Land 2% 5%
32 Roulac & Dimick, The Real Estate Finance Journal, p. 10, Winter 1991
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Yet there are other reasons behind U.S. pension funds'
reluctance to enter the international real estate market.
According to a study conducted by the Roulac Consulting Group
for the $62 billion California Public Employees' Retirement
System unfamiliarity with investment environment, lack of
knowledge of important investment networks and relationships,
and concern about potential economic and political
instability are three of the major deterrents shared by U.S.
pension funds towards international real estate investment.
However, according to this study, due to the continuing
globalization of the world's economy, diversification
strategies will demand that portfolios more closely reflect
the relative distribution of global wealth. Today, the
California Public Employees Retirement System is actively
pursuing the concept of international real estate investment.
Although many pension plans will undoubtedly follow suit in
the future, the poor experience they have had so far in the
domestic market may encourage foreign real estate initiates
to buy into funds.
British Coal
U.K. pension funds have had some of the best investment
performance in the world, with an average real rate of return
of 4.4% per annum over the past 15 years. In contrast with
U.S. pension funds, they have had a long tradition of
international real estate investment. However, like their
U.S. counterparts, some are currently following a strategy of
disinvestment in the U.S. market. The pension fund for the
British Coal Corp., with 13% of its $12 billion in assets
allocated to real estate, is one example.
During the past two years, British Coal has been
liquidating its $1 billion U.S. property portfolio that was
invested through two New York-based real estate investment
trusts. British Coal decided to sell its U.S. portfolio
because it wanted more liquidity and because returns were
disappointing. Although the U.S. investments did, in fact,
have good overall returns, they were due to favorable
currency movements, not intrinsic property performance.
According to CIN Properties, the real estate subsidiary
for British Coal's pension fund, the only real estate
investments they make in the future will be in the U.K., in
spite of the opportunities in other European countries.
Unlike some of the Swedish investors, their feeling is that
the size and diversity of the European market will always
work to the favor of local investors and that they can
conduct much more business in the U.K. simply because they
know their own market so well.33
33 Williams, Terry "Realty Gets Mixed Reviews" Pensions & Investments, 30 April 1990
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Their policy of disinvestment of U.S. property does not
extend to other U.S. equity investments, such as stocks.
This is consistent with the current U.S. preference for
international equity investments to international real
estate, equities being a tried and true investment at home.
Shell Pension Fund Foundation
Dutch institutional investors also share an interest in
equity investments. But this phenomenon is relatively
recent. Traditionally, Dutch pension funds held as much as
90% in fixed interest instruments. However, this has been
changing since the 1980's when yields on government bonds
dropped from 12% in 1981 to 6.5% in 1987. A 1990 survey
conducted by Bank Mees & Hope N.V. in Amsterdam shows that,
on average, Dutch funds target 20.3% equity allocations, up
from an average 8.35% at the end of 1988.
The Shell Pension Fund Foundation, with assets of nearly
$9 billion, is no newcomer to the equities scene. While
other Dutch funds held less than 10% of their portfolios in
shares in 1988, Shell held 28% in stocks and intends to
significantly increase this in the future. Table 13, Shell
Pension Fund's Investments by Asset Class, shows recent
aggregate allocations compared to long-term targets.
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Table 13: Shell Pension Fund's Investments by Asset Class
1988 1989 Long-Term Target
Fixed-Income 58% 47% 20%
Stocks 28% 37% 50%
Real Estate 14% 15% 30%
Table 13 shows a remarkable 30% maximum allocation to
real estate and a dramatic move away from bonds. 3 4  Where
several Swedish institutional investors are looking to
achieve a 50/50 mix of real and nominal assets in the next
few years, Shell appears to be moving away from this profile
towards an 80/20 mix. As illustrated in Table 14, U.K.
Pension Fund Aggregate Asset Allcoations, this is more along
the lines of U.K. pension funds, which held roughly 80% of
their portfolios in real assets at the end of 1988 (as per
the definitions at the beginning of the chapter).
Table 14: U.K. Pension Fund Aggregate Asset Allocations
U.K. Pensions
1988
Fixed Income 14%
Stocks 69%
Real Estate 11%
Cash 6%
The Shell pension fund has
amongst the most sophisticated
a reputation for being
and independent-minded
34 However, a 30% allocation to real estate is not an unusual strategy for Shell,
having been as high as 40% in 1985. These allocation ceilings have never been reached.
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institutional investors in Holland, standing somewhat apart
from the other Dutch funds. According to Mr. J. A. de Kreij,
General Manager of the fund, the fund's active liabilities
are increasing at least as fast as increases in GNP.
Therefore, his primary objectives are to narrow the gap
between the development of liabilities and the development
ofinvestments and to reduce the cost of incremental
liabilities to plan sponsors.
This strategy is reflective of the kinds of efforts
being made by European investment management firms and
performance measurers to get pension funds to focus on
performance as well as security as investment objectives. A
simple calculation used by Frank Russell Consultants in
London drives this point home. For every pound paid out by a
British pension fund, approximately 21p comes from
contributions and 79p from investment return. If the
investment return were only 75p, the cost of contributions
would increase from 21p to 25p. A portfolio limited to bonds
might only yield 60p in investment return, requiring 40p in
contributions. In this scenario, an employee might have to
make double the contributions to receive the same benefits
upon retirement.
For the fund's real estate investments, Mr. de Kreij
expects a long-term real rate of return similar to stocks and
significantly higher than that of bonds. In his view, real
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estate is attractive to the fund for three primary reasons.
It is appreciated first for the stabilizing effect its low
correlation with stocks has on the overall portfolio.
Furthermore, real estate is viewed as a long-term investment
and, mixed with stocks, helps the fund achieve a more
efficient fit between its liabilities and investments. And
lastly, Dutch schemes are required by law to achieve a
minimum performance of 4% growth per annum. This, and the
downside of not being able to meet disbursements, clearly
makes a heavier weighting in equities too risky.35
A sister company in the U.S., Argus Realty Services,
Inc., is Shell's real estate management and acquisition arm.
All acquisitions are handled directly by Argus, who sometimes
relies on outside advisors for specific services, such as
marketing reports.
Traditionally, Shell has focused on a core real estate
portfolio which met certain criteria. Within any one city,
they want the best locations. Shell has had to develop over
70% of its properties in order to get the locations it has
wanted. According to de Kreij, the size of their portfolio
allows them to undertake this development risk. Furthermore,
Shell wants to invest primarily in the property they know
35 Although it would appear that the effects of a real estate cycle could be equally
devastating, presumably the low correlation between stocks and real estate will help
assure return objectives.
66
best (office buildings) and intends to build on that strength
worldwide.
One of the first Dutch pension funds to enter the U.S.
real estate market in the 1970's, Shell currently has over
half a million square feet of space under development in each
of the following cities: Boston, New York, Atlanta, and
Cincinnati. They believe there is no country in the world
which better enables them to place the volume of funds they
need to invest in high quality properties. Nonetheless,
Shell holds no property in California for two reasons:
earthquake risk and the unitary tax. 36 However, there was
minimal damage to the newer, better-engineered buildings
following the recent earthquake in San Francisco, and
problems arising from the unitary tax have been resolved. As
a consequence, Argus has recently been contemplating entering
that market. 37
Closing Remarks
In this chapter, I have tried to provide a general
explanation of the investment patterns of some Swedish
institutional investors. I have contrasted them with
investment patterns of the Dutch, who are viewed as some of
the most sophisticated and progressive investors in Europe,
with the purpose of illustrating a possible direction Swedish
36 The unitary tax taxed the worldwide operations of a company doing business in
California.
37 Interview, Melba Eakin, Vice President & Commercial Manager, Argus Realty
Services, Inc., New York, 11 July 1991
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investment behavior may take in the future. U.S. and U.K.
institutional investment profiles have been included because
it is their research and investment practices which are, to a
large extent, having the most influence on the patterns of
European investment.
The next chapter will look at social and political
trends and pressures which are likely to further shape the
patterns of European investment.
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CHAPTER FOUR - ECONOMIC & SOCIO-POLITICAL TRENDS
The uniting of the European markets in 1992, the
"marketization" of Eastern Europe, and the growing momentum
of Asian economies are creating an abundance of investment
opportunities. These will undoubtedly be in direct
competition with U.S. real estate in attracting foreign
investors. Or will they be?
According to feedback I have received in various
interviews, the Eastern European markets are still too thin
to be attractive to institutional investors. One person
believed that even the largest cities in Eastern Europe will
have the equivalent depth of, say, a small city in America's
mid-west for the foreseeable future.
Similarly, like their U.S. counterparts, most European
institutional investors are not yet prepared to make a big
splash in Asian real estate. Some markets, Tokyo, for
example, have very high barriers to entry. Most, however,
are avoided simply for the inherent risk stemming from a lack
of information, political instability and shallowness of
market. In Asia, the uncertainty and unfamiliarity
confronting foreign investors spans several countries,
requiring perhaps a greater educational and administrative
process than is warranted by other better established
markets, such as Europe and the U.S. Some institutional
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investors have found that investing in cities linked to
Pacific Rim activity, such as Vancouver and Seattle, is an
attractive alternative to Asian investment.'
Although unification of the European economies is
unlikely to create an explosion of real estate opportunities,
there are undeniably pressures which, combined with the
effects of unification, will impact the investment patterns
of European institutional investors and ultimately affect
European placement of capital in U.S. real estate.
Two issues which are likely to shake the dust from
conservative fund management policies are the aging of the
European population and the deregulation of financial markets
across Europe. Both phenomena will accelerate the transition
to a more performance-oriented environment and thereby create
a much more competitive climate in the area of fund
management.
Aging Populations
As illustrated in Chart 10, % of Population Aged 65 or
Older, future demographic developments in most Western
countries will reflect a progressive aging of the population.2
1 Williams, Terry "Dutch Fund Roars into World's Realty Markets" Pensions &
Investments, p. 3, 25 June 1990
2 1990 percentages are forecasted.
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Chart 10: % of Population Aged 65 or older
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It can therefore be expected that the wealth of pension
funds will increase and, at the same time, that their role in
the capital market will strengthen.
A study was conducted in 1989 to show the influences of
an ageing population on the capital market supply of pension
funds over the long term. The analysis covered the period
1990 - 2025 and made use of an extended version of an
economic and demographic computational model published in
Huijser and Van Loo (1986) .3 The model served to project
3 The findings of this analysis, which are included in this paper, were summarized in
the following citation: Huijser, A.P. "Capital Market Effects of the Ageing
Population" European Economic Review 34 (1990) 987-1009 (North-Holland)
I
movements in benefits, premiums, and reserves for both State
and supplementary pensions in the Netherlands, on the basis
of alternative assumptions about economic growth, inflation,
and interest rates. This study is of particular interest for
the purposes of this paper because, like Sweden, the
Netherlands is a small, open economy with an unfunded State
pension system.
For a better understanding of the study, a brief
comparison of the Dutch and Swedish pension systems precedes
a discussion of the study's findings. 4
Similar to Sweden, there are three basic categories of
pension arrangements in The Netherlands5 : the social security
or State pension scheme, supplementary pensions, and
individual arrangements. Unlike Sweden however, where State
and supplementary pensions are both unfunded, only the State
pension scheme is unfunded in The Netherlands, the
supplementary system being funded.
As of 1987, State pension liabilities totalled Fl.24
billion ($12 billion), 6 or 6.3% of net national income. As
illustrated in Table 15, Dutch State Pension Income &
4 Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this section was obtained from
the following source: Huijser, A.P. "Capital Market Effects of the Ageing Population"
European Economic Review, 34 (1990) 987-1009. (North Holland)
5 The population of The Netherlands is approximately 14 million, compared to Sweden's
8.5 million.
6 The symbol "Fl." is used to signify Dutch guilders.
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Liabilities, between 1970 and 1987, premiums paid by all
income earners have been more than sufficient to cover
pension liabilities in most years. As mentioned in Chapter
2, this has not been the case in most recent years in Sweden.
Table 15: Dutch State Pension Income & Liabilities
(in % of net national income)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
Pensions Paid Out 4.7 5.8 6.3 6.1 6.3
Premiums Received 4.7 5.6 5.6 6.3 6.6
Public Grants 0.1 0.4 0.7 0 0
Interest Received Q 0.1 1 1
Surplus 0.1 0.2 0 0.2 0.3
For perspective,
Social Security Scheme
Chart 11, Receipts
s as % f GDP, 1984
& Expenditures of
- 1986, shows that
average expenditures on OASDI,7 public assistance, government
schemes and family allowances in Sweden and The Netherlands
exceeded those of six other developed countries between 1984
and 1986.
7 old-age, survivors, and disability insurance
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Chart 11: Average Receipts/Exenditures of Social Security as % GDP. 1984 - 1986
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In The Netherlands, an estimated 90% of employees
participate in supplementary pension schemes. Most of these
are compulsory and are regarded as supplementary income to
the State pensions. In 1987, supplementary pension
liabilities totalled roughly Fl.19 billion ($9.5 billion), or
5% of net national income.8
Two interesting points brought out in Table 16, Dutch
Supplementary Pension Income & Liabilities, are that, between
1970 and 1987, an increase in investment income resulted in a
proportionate decrease in required premiums, and that in 1987
8 Including State liabilities, total payout in 1987 was roughly $21.5 billion. This
compares to Swedish State pension liabilities of SKr69 billion ($10.6 billion) in
1989, which then increased to SKr77 billion ($11.9 billion) in 1990, a 10.6% increase.
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the financial surplus of supplementary pensions equalled
almost half the domestic supply of capital.
Table 16: Dutch Supplementary Pension Income & Liabilities
(in % of net national income)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987
Suppl. Pensions Paid 2.2 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.9
Life Insur. Premiums 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1
Premiums Received 5.5 6.6 6.2 4.9 4.7
Investment Income 1.9 2.8 4.1 6.1 6.5
Surplus 4.4 5.9 6.4 6.4 6.1
As % of domestic 43 41 46 45 43
capital market
One of the first conclusions drawn from the study
concerns the financing of the State old age pension. Under
the basic scenario, the premium percentages required to meet
liabilities in this unfunded system were found to increase
from 11.9% in 1990 to almost 20% in 2025. Under different
scenarios in which partial funding was applied and a real
rate of return of 1.5% was assumed, it was possible to slow,
but not eliminate, this increase in premium percentages.
This illustrates that even a partially-funded system would be
inadequate to keep pace with the increase in liabilities.
Furthermore, this model does not consider the impact of an
increased role of pension funds on the domestic capital
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market supply, of which pension fund surpluses already
exceeded 43% in volume in 1987.9
The most significant finding of the study was that, as a
result of the ageing of the population, the relative wealth
of the pension funds would grow by 60% - 80%.10 This
increase, in tandem with the at least partial inflexibility
of pension premiums, suggests that the capital market supply
of pension funds may become more sensitive to the variability
of interest rates and nominal economic growth. As a
consequence, it is inevitable that the investment strategies
of fund managers in a small economy like The Netherlands will
take on a more international orientation. This is true
because, even though the ageing population is a worldwide
phenomenon," differences in timing and magnitude will provide
a greater diversity in supply and demand conditions than are
available within a small domestic market.
9 In 1969, Dutch employers and employees organizations adopted the principle that all
employees with 40 years' service should receive 70% of their last salary from the old-
age pension (basic plus supplementary) . However, current discussions to reduce the
cost of financing supplementary pension plans may change this norm. (Lutjens, Erik
"The Legal Aspects of Dutch Supplementary Pension Plans" Benefits & Compensation
International, p. 5, March 1990)
10 Huijser notes that this result depends on the relative level of pensions and on
the choice of the actuarial interest rate. Nonetheless, according to the model, this
60-80% growth is not affected by assumptions about economic growth, inflation, or
interest rates.
11 At least, it is safe to assert this for most developed countries.
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Through a comparison of results of the basic and
stationary scenarios,1 2 Huijser found that, given the
demographic development, the assumed nominal income growth
was a dominant variable in determining the capital market
supply of the pension funds over a long term perspective.
From his simulations, he concluded that the long term role of
pension funds would become more sensitive to short term
economic conditions, while their structural supply of funds
would depend primarily on the unpredictable development of
nominal income growth.
Assuming Huijser's findings are accurate, they suggest
that pension fund managers in countries affected by the
ageing phenomenon will increasingly adopt performance-
oriented investment policies. Despite many fund managers'
disenchantment with equity investment following the crash of
1987, a performance-oriented strategy would further suggest
an increasing role of equities within the aggregate asset
allocation. If this is so, in order to take advantage of the
stabilizing effects of real estate on a portfolio of shares,
allocations to that asset class should increase as well.
12 In stationary scenarios, the influence of productivity, growth, and inflation is
eliminated. Economic growth is wholly determined by population growth, labor
participation, and unemployment.
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Deregulatory Environment in Europe
Political expectations geared to 1992 are pressing
deregulation forward both at the EC level and in the
individual member countries, with a free flow of services
between member countries as one of the primary objectives.
Banks and Insurance Companies
One effect deregulation will have within the financial
industry is worth looking at more closely: an increasing
number of mergers between banks and insurance companies.
Mergers between banks and insurance companies are a natural
outcome of deregulation as these institutions attempt to
position themselves for survival as rules governing their
operations are adapted to legislation in the EC area and the
industries become more competitive.
In the area of insurance, for example, EC law makes a
distinction between large risks and mass risks. Large risk
refers to property and casualty insurance written for large
industrial corporations. Mass risk refers to consumer
insurance, like auto, home, and boat insurance. Since 1990,
an insurance company that has been set up in one EC country
has been permitted to insure large risks in another member
country, without having to be licensed in that country. If
adopted, current EC legislation will also remove most legal
barriers in the field of non-life insurance.
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Similar changes are underway in the banking sector. For
example, a credit institution in the EC which is licensed to
do business in its home country, will, in principle, be able
to conduct all the banking activities for which it has
permission at home throughout the EC. This means that all
citizens and companies within the EC will have access to the
same range of financial services.
As a result of these kinds of changes, both industries
are undergoing restructuring within the EC. Alliances are
being formed between companies in the various countries, and
groups with both banking and insurance operations are being
formed in an increasing number of countries. 13 Concepts for
covering the insurance requirements of large industrial
companies throughout the EC are being worked out.
During the past year in Sweden, a round of mergers has
been set off by a proposal that would remove ownership
barriers between banks and insurance companies. Increased
financial resources would enable Swedish banks and insurance
firms to protect their markets from outsiders as Sweden
removes restrictions on financial operations by foreigners.
As the proposals also remove ownership restrictions, enabling
foreigners to take 20% voting control and 40% equity in
Sweden's financial institutions, some banks and insurance
13 Skandia, for example, has formed alliances with Vesta in Norway and Storebrand in
Denmark. (Kruse)
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companies are banding together to reduce the possibility of
foreign takeovers.14
For example, SPP, the white-collar worker's pension
insurance fund, made a SKr4.6 billion bid for 44% of the
voting control of Gota, the parent of Sweden's fourth largest
commercial bank. In another transaction, SPP and Trygg-Hansa
Life have co-ordinated their businesses under Trygg-Hansa
Holding, in which SPP is an owner and has equal voting power
as Trygg-Hansa Life. Sweden's largest bank, SE Banken, lured
by the possibility of capturing a slice of the growing
European market for pension and life insurance policies, made
a SKr4.7 billion bid for 28% of the voting control in
Skandia. 15
These trends would suggest that an insurance company's
expansion of business activity in foreign markets would be
accompanied by a similar amplification of foreign
liabilities. If it is true that most institutional investors
try to balance the amount of investments they hold in a
particular currency to the liabilities they carry in that
14 Burton, John "Insurance Against Hard Times Ahead" Financial Times, p. 26, 2
November 1990
15 Nonetheless, scepticism persists that the mergers will not deliver the promised
benefits. SPP could find, for instance, that minority shareholders in Gota, including
SE Banken and other insurers, will block its use of the bank as an entree into the
private insurance market. Skandia officials feel that Skandia and SE Banken should
concentrate on overseas expansion, since not enough money could be saved in Sweden to
justify the cost of the acquisition. (Burton)
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currency, this would also suggest that allocations to foreign
real estate by institutional investors will increase.
Pension Funds
Other ambitious EC objectives include freedom of cross-
border participation in supplementary pension schemes and
free competition for fund managers. In The Netherlands, for
example, pension funds are not required to have a license to
provide services. According to an EC condition of equal
treatment of pension funds domiciled in The Netherlands and
pension funds domiciled in other EC countries,16 it follows
that the licensing requirement may not be imposed on pension
funds domiciled elsewhere in the EC either. The pension
funds domiciled in other EC countries are therefore free to
provide services in The Netherlands regardless of whether
they have an office there.
All told, there are over fifty different EC measures
influencing pensions and employee benefits in the community,
including directives governing financial services, free
movement, company law, and taxation.17 A community-wide
16 According to a European Court of Justice decision taken on 4 December 1986, it is
permissible to make the provision of insurance services dependent on the granting of a
licence by the member state in which the services are to be performed, provided that
the licensing requirement- applies equally to national insurance companies and
insurance companies located in another EC member state. (European Court Reports, 1986,
p. 3791)
17 In the area of fund management, there has been speculation that the European Court
will rule on asset allocation policies in the future. This could benefit some
institutions, such as the Dutch fund ABP, which is currently restricted by law to an
asset allocation ratio of 85% nominal, 15% real. (Rompelman)
scheme has even been discussed. However, the problems
relating to transferability in all cross-border proposals are
so complex, they dwarf any differences in national pension
structures and investment policies.18
The personal pension plan, already popular in the U.K.,
would solve many of the questions of transferability, as it
is not tied to a company. As yet, this idea has not taken
hold on the Continent. Furthermore, although personal plans
are appealing to financial institutions and many employees,
those with vested interests in existing systems are likely to
resist change.19
As confidence in State pension systems in Europe wane,
for reasons including those discussed earlier, another
emerging trend is increasing demand for private pension
schemes. The U.K. private pension industry, more mature than
those in other European countries, is perhaps a bell-wether
for the future direction of the Continental private pension
industry. In the past twenty years, the U.K. has witnessed a
proliferation of private schemes and a tremendous growth in
pension fund assets. This has been accompanied by similar
growth in investment management companies, benefit
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18 Euromoney, July 1990
19 ibid.
consultants, performance measurers, and asset allocation
advisers. 20
Conclusions
Following are several conclusions which can be drawn from the
body of this chapter:
1) As populations age in most Western countries, the
coffers of State pensions will accumulate significantly
larger amounts of funds which will need to be invested.
2) As State pension systems are strained, beneficiaries
will look for alternative ways to protect their retirement
pay and larger amounts of money will flow to privately
insured pensions.
3) As funded and partially funded State pension systems
(and even unfunded systems protected by a buffer fund, such
as Sweden's AP) increase their premium rates to keep pace
with pension liabilities, they will be pressured to maximize
investment income.
4) As demand increases for private schemes and market
barriers are torn down, the marketing efforts of insurers
will have to focus on the performance of their funds.
20 Beavan, Benefits & Compensation International, May 1990
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5) As European fund managers place more emphasis on
performance as an investment objective, they will become more
sophisticated in their investment practices. MPT will have a
growing influence on aggregate asset allocation, causing the
disparity between European fund management behavior and U.K.
and U.S. behavior to narrow.
6) An increasingly open market would suggest greater market
efficiency, a force which would further level any
dissimilarities in investment behavior.
7) There will be increased interest in foreign investment
as European institutions:
a. seek to place a growing amount of capital as
domestic opportunities become scarcer
b. adopt more sophisticated portfolio management
techniques and seek wider diversification of risk
c. endeavor to match their investments to growing
foreign liabilities
84
CHAPTER FIVE - THE OUTLOOK
Although the consequences of such issues as an aging
population, a weakening State pension system, and a growing
sophistication in portfolio management strongly suggest that
Swedish institutional investors will significantly increase
their investments in foreign real estate, it is not a
foregone conclusion that they will have any great presence in
the United States during the next three to five years.
This is so for a number of reasons. First of all, the
effects of the aging phenomenon as described by Huijser and
the impact that a perceived weakening of the State pension
system will have on the demand of private schemes probably
will not be felt with any real significance for many years.
Therefore, there will not be an immediate and inordinate
swelling of State and private pension funds in Sweden, nor
the concurrent surge of new capital into foreign markets that
might be expected.
Growing investor sophistication, on the other hand,
probably will have a significant impact on the aggregate
asset allocation of Swedish institutional investors in the
next five years. As they have been deregulated, these
investors have increasingly shifted into international
equities and real estate for the diversification attributes
they bring to a portfolio of investments.
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However, most Swedish institutional investors view the
next several years as teething years in foreign real estate
investment. Furthermore, as EC deregulatory measures are
exercised, Swedish insurance companies will be largely
preoccupied with strengthening and expanding their presence
in Europe. With their focus so oriented, it is possible that
Europe, the "home market", will be the major recipient of
Sweden's allocations to foreign real estate during the next
five years.
Yet, it is not enough to consider what is happening in
Sweden's "home market" in contemplating to what extent they
may invest in U.S. real estate in the coming few years. For
a more complete picture, it is worthwhile considering if some
of the reasons foreigners have traditionally invested in U.S.
real estate, as summarized in the first chapter, carry the
same weight today with Swedish institutional investors.
There is evidence, for example, that high property
returns in the U.S. are being seriously challenged by returns
on European properties. Although total returns on U.S.
office space, a staple of foreign institutional investors,
averaged 15% between 1981 and 1986, that average dropped to
1% between 1987 and 1990. As mentioned earlier, British Coal
found that, in recent years, the high returns on U.S. real
estate investments had more to do with favorable exchange
rates than the intrinsic performance of U.S. property.
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The results from a recent study of seven major European
property markets would suggest that European markets are much
healthier than U.S. markets. Table 17, U.S. Total Property
Returns -vs- European Real Property Returns, contrasts the
findings of that study with performance data provided by the
Russell-NCREIF Property Index.1
Table 17: U.S. Total Property Returns -vs- European Real Property Returns
Total Return Total Return Real Return
U.S. Office U.S. Retail Eurooe
Last 5 Years 1.6% 10.5% 16.2%
Last 10 Years 7.2% 11.4% 12.5%
Although the decline in the value of the dollar against
most currencies in the 1980's made the value of dollar-
denominated assets appear low, the value of the dollar has
more or less stabilized since 1988. Therefore, although U.S.
real estate may still be comparatively inexpensive, it may
have as much to do with over-supply factors as exchange
rates. In fact, according to at least one pension advisor,
the recent strengthening of the dollar has caused some
prospective foreign investors to consider transacting only
when rates are more favorable.
Chart 12, Devaluation of the Dollar Against Other
Currencies, indexes each of the graphed currencies to a
1 Gelbtuch, Howard C. "The London Office Market" The Apraisal Journal, p. 29, Vol.
LIX, Number 1, January 1991
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benchmark of 100 in 1983 and plots subsequent changes in
value of the dollar against those currencies. 2 By 1991, the
index value of the British pound is 97 and that of the
Swedish krona 88, reflecting significantly less gain on the
dollar than the Japanese yen or Dutch guilder over this time
period.
Chart 12: Devaluation of the Dollar Against Other Currencies
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The size and depth of the U.S. market has ensured
liquidity for foreign investors in the past. However,
compared to the mid 1980's, this phenomenon is less evident
today. As a result of a variety of factors, including
changing financial markets, an increased presence of
institutional investors in U.S. real estate, and favorable
tax codes, most U.S. markets are oversupplied. While office
space under construction in the U.S. at the beginning of 1990
equalled approximately 4.5% of existing inventory, the same
figure for Europe was only 2%. Furthermore, unlike the
United States, prime space is not readily available in most
European markets, causing an upward pressure on rents. Table
18, Summary of U.S. & European Office Markets, December 1989,
reflects higher average rents and lower vacancies in European
markets.3
Table 18: Summary of U.S. & European Office Markets, December 1989
Market Size Constr. Absorption Change from Avg. Rent
(mM .m§L Vacancy 19_j p.s.f. (US$)
Europe 1,492 29.2 2.5% 18.3% +3.4% $36.63
United States 2,549 111.0 19.5% 70.0% +0.4% $21.70
Although commercial properties tend not to transact as
frequently in Europe as they do in the U.S., which creates a
3 Gelbtuch The Appraisal Journal. 1991
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less liquid market, the sizes of many of the individual
markets are comparable to those in the U.S.. Chart 13, U.S.
& European Office Markets, reflects similarities in the
approximate sizes of eight U.S. and European office markets,
in millions of square feet. 4
Chart 13: U.S. & European Office Markets
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Inflation in the U.S. has averaged 4.8% over the past
three years, almost half Sweden's 8.9%. Assuming equal
performance of property in Sweden and the U.S., this suggests
the opportunity for higher real returns in the U.S. (At the
same time, however, for Swedish institutional investors with
a predominance of fixed-income investments, it could be
argued that investing in inflation-linked assets in an
economy with almost half the rate of inflation to which the
4 European and New York data from Pensions & Investments, 29 April 1991. Other U.S.
data from Roulac Group. These numbers are intended to roughly convey the relative
sizes of some European and U.S. office markets. It is not known to what extent fringe
markets have been included in tabulating square footages in each of these markets.
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institution's liabilities are tied might yield only half the
hedging benefit for the overall portfolio.) Such would be
the case for the AP Fund, for example, which is only
entitled to allocate 5% of the entire portfolio to real
estate and none to stocks. This point would be moot,
however, for some of the large Swedish insurance companies
seeking to match investments with their U.S. liabilities.
According to the current U.S. tax laws, foreign tax-
exempt investors are exempt from taxes in the U.S. on
interest income earned on bank deposits. To be exempt from
taxes on any other interest earned, the interest must either
be treated as portfolio interest or be sheltered through a
tax treaty between the home country of the investor and the
United States. Non-sheltered income from equity investments
(rental income, dividends, capital gains, etc.) is taxable at
the prevailing U.S. corporate rates.
If a loan is made to an organization in which the
foreign tax-exempt lender holds more than 10% of the equity,
interest earned is not classified as portfolio interest and
the lender is subject to a maximum 30% withholding tax on
this income. A U.S. treaty with Japan has reduced this tax
to a maximum of 10%. U.S. treaties with the U.K., The
Netherlands, and Sweden, however, have eliminated the
withholding tax completely.
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Not surprisingly, many foreign investors have found ways
to further reduce their U.S. tax liabilities, through thin
capitalization and equity-kickers, for example. Yet, the
U.S. tax code is a wild card in U.S. real estate investment.
Although there are no pending bills in Congress to change
these regulations, history shows a tendency to revise the tax
code every few years.
Alhough a snapshot of the U.S. real estate market today
is grim, Swedish institutions are interested in the long-term
benefits of real estate investment and may share the attitude
of many Dutch institutional investors, which is "no market is
a good market forever". The investment strategy of many
foreign institutional investors generally cuts across cycles
and, if anything, regards cyclical troughs as providers of
opportunity. If this is true of Swedish institutional
investors, we should expect to see their growing influence in
U.S. real estate investment during the next five years.
Working With Swedish Institutional Investors
So far, Swedish institutional investors have really only
made inroads into international real estate investment in
Europe and, like in Sweden, have shown a propensity for
controlling as much of the development/ownership process as
possible. Less than a year after exchange-control
restrictions were relaxed in 1989, Trygg-Hansa's Investment
Division established an office in London specifically to
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monitor developments in that market and oversee its growing
portfolio of investments. Reflecting a similar desire for
control, Skandia prefers direct investment in Europe and
intends to establish in-house property management expertise
for its European holdings through a network of regional
management offices.
However, neither company believes it understands the
U.S. market well enough to follow similar strategies here.
Both Trygg-Hansa and Skandia have indicated that any ventures
into U.S. real estate would be pursued with a well-
established local partner and that, at least initially,
property management services would be purchased locally.
I would conclude that, disregarding tax implications and
speaking from a Swedish perspective only, a general
partnership would provide the appropriate framework for a
working relationship between Swedish institutional investors
and interested U.S. parties. From the Swedish standpoint,
this would allow them to add value through a higher degree of
participation and, at the same time, to learn the U.S. market
firsthand.
If the main reason that European real estate markets
will be more attractive to Swedish institutions in the next
five years is because the Swedes are more familiar with those
markets, prospective U.S. partners could facilitate and even
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encourage investment in U.S. real estate by making both the
investment process and U.S. market behavior as familiar and
unambiguous as possible. Bearing the profile of this
investor group in mind, interested U.S. parties could, for
example, organize a series of educational seminars through
the help of real estate professionals at the Royal Institute
of Technology in Stockholm. An initial approach such as this
would be effective in establishing the foundations for the
kind of good-faith relationship sought by developers and
investors in real estate on both sides of the Atlantic.
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